There have been many devices and systems developed that are geared to the protection and recovery of valuable assets. Among the most novel of these are those used for the protection of currency and other small high-value objects such as jewelry where the recovery device is embedded directly into the object that is being protected.
There are numerous methods available for protecting high-value assets such as currency at a banking establishment. These include but are not limited to: 1) training; 2) surveillance cameras; 3) reward program; 4) unarmed guards; 5) police tellers; 6) off-duty police officers; 7) bandit barriers; 8) bait money; and 9) explosive devices and tracking systems. Training is the cornerstone to robbery prevention and safety. By maintaining proper security protocols, cash control (to minimize cash loss) and safety precautions, bank personnel can be the most instrumental in robbery avoidance and, in the case where a robbery takes place, apprehension of the criminal. Surveillance cameras placed throughout a bank branch are usually employed as an apprehension tool although there may be some unquantified deterrent effect, especially in the queue line. Given the prevalence of surveillance cameras it sometimes serves as the only record of the bank robbery and the only evidence for the police to use to identify the thief. It is a standard policy for many industries with highly valuable assets to offer a reward program to provide a reward if a robber is identified. Several instances have been reported where a person involved in a robbery actually knew the robber and the reward system helps encourage witnesses to come forward. Unarmed security guards are used primarily as deterrents to robbers for banks and other institutions. During an incident they are instructed primarily to “observe and report”. Chances are that the presence of a security guard in a location will redirect the robber to go to another location without a guard. Police tellers are used by banks in particular to “observe and report” during an incident but unlike a security guard they are trained as full tellers and work in plain clothes. They are off-duty police officers and hired at a police salary rate. They share the same service and sales responsibilities as regular tellers. They are commonly used in frequently robbed locations. Off-Duty police officers are sometimes used as armed guards for locations with substantial robbery problems. A good source of personnel for this is the local police department. If not possible, a security firm made up of retired police is a good source for well-trained armed personnel. This can be a very expensive undertaking. Bandit barriers are permanent, bullet-proof shields between assets being protected and the robber. These have been particularly effective in locations where other methods like guards have proven ineffective as a deterrent. With an initial cost of about $1,000 per linear foot, setup is high. The payback for such an investment is first the savings in cash from a frequently robbed location. Also there is the added benefit of avoiding associated costs from a robbery such as lost time and teller fatigue and turnover. Bait money is a cash reserve in a teller's drawer with pre-recorded serial numbers to be handed out in case of a robbery. If the robber is apprehended the serial numbers can be used to trace it back to a particular robbery and aid in conviction. This is purely a method for identification after apprehension.
Banks also use explosive devices and tracking systems both for apprehension (and recovery) as well as prevention. They can be used in prevention when word is leaked that these devices are used in a particular area. It is stressed that training in this case is critical because many bank robbers present instructions to not pass “bait money or dye packs” since knowledge of these methods are apparently fairly well known. Each bank establishes their own policies and methods for training and passing these devices to a robber. The dye pack was invented to stain stolen currency in a manner that “renders a bank robbery pointless” as taught by Robeson (U.S. Pat. No. 3,564,525) and Howett (U.S. Pat. No. 1,923,979). It does this by exploding a colored dye that stains the money, making it obvious that it has been involved in a robbery. In some devices, tear-gas is included in the dye to not only mark the presence of the stolen currency but also show a colored cloud for searching by law-enforcement. A dye pack consists of a hollowed-out stack of real bills with chemicals and electronics inside, usually with one or two bills stuck on the top and bottom of the stack. The dye pack sits idle in “safe mode” while in the teller drawer on a magnetic plate until a robbery occurs. During the robbery the teller is supposed to subtly slip the device in with other money. Removing the device from the magnetic plate does not cause the dye to be released; it is simply armed at that point. When the bank robber passes a radio activation field near the front door the device is programmed to start a timer for later release, allowing time for the bank robber to get some distance from the bank before the money is stained. In many cases the hands and/or clothing of the bank robber are stained making identification easier. Initially these devices were rigid but development in electronic design have allowed for the device [Keniston, S. E., “Bendable currency security dye pack”, U.S. Pat. No. 5,196,828] and even the chemical pouches [Keniston, S. E., “Bendable currency security dye pack”, U.S. Pat. No. 5,485,143] to be flexible, thus allowing them to be passed during a robber with low chance of detection by the robber (who is often an “amateur”). An alternate activation method would be to have a local RF transmitter near the pack to keep it inactive. When an adequate distance is achieved between the pack and the RF transmitter, and the pack is no longer sensing the RF signal, the pack would activate. While a very useful tool, it has to be noted that this type of device is explosive and requires special handling. For that reason some banks have not adopted this technology to protect their employees and customers.
The other prevalent in-drawer cash protection system employed by banks is the miniature RF beacon. As in the case of the dye pack it sits idle in the teller drawer until activated by lifting off of a magnetic plate. Local receiving towers in the proximity of the bank pick up the small RF transmission of the device [Allen, M. F., “ELECTRONIC DETECTION AND TRACING MEANS”, U.S. Pat. No. 3,618,059]. This would immediately start the transmission of a signal received by a network of stations located through a city both near the bank and along likely escape routes for the robber. The police could also be equipped with receivers to tell if they are close to the stolen currency pack. Later refinements allowed the pursuers to not only determine they are close, but also determine range and direction to the stolen device [Culpepper, J. W., Currie, H. A.; Heathcock, W. F., “Beacon tracking system”, U.S. Pat. No. 4,021,807]. While the transmission device in the cash can be extremely small, one of the most significant limitations to this technology is the requirement for receiver stations to be placed around the area of operation. If the device should get outside of the installation region, it can no longer be tracked. To cover the whole lower-48 states of the US, assuming a 5-mile radius of receiver coverage would take a minimum of 40,000 stations (excluding line-of-sight issues that would substantially increase the number of stations). It is probably financially impossible to place receiving stations throughout the country for a single application. Therefore it is likely that only local areas will be covered which leaves the system vulnerable to coverage gaps.
As an augmentation to the miniature RF-beacon approach, Grimm (U.S. Pat. No. 6,801,129) proposed using a cellular data transmission system transmitting location information from a Global Positioning System receiver. The Global Positioning System (or GPS as it is commonly known) is comprised of a number of satellites circling the Earth that radiate timing signals that are controlled by a network of ground stations. By measuring the arrival of these signals at a receiver, it is possible to determine the location of the receiver to very high precision. While Mohan (U.S. Pat. No. 6,121,922) teaches the combined use of GPS and a mobile transmitter in a compact form-factor, Grimm extended this concept to include a RF beacon that allowed for the local isolation of stolen device with far greater precision than can be achieved with a cellular network location or GPS position fix. U.S. Pat. Nos. 6,665,613, 6,480,147, 6,271,757 teach different variations of defining regions within a tracking device which upon the device getting a GPS location (or any kind of position determination) outside of the region certain actions will occur including, but not limited to, reporting to a network, sending alerts, or sounding an alarm. All these patents teach that there is some alarm mechanism in which some security organization or law enforcement agency can be alerted to a theft of the asset under protection by the tracking device. However, none of these references teaches how such a device came to be installed at a particular fixed location and how a device is associated with a law enforcement agency in a given jurisdiction. It is unclear if these devices were pre-programmed at the factory to be matched with their end location. Since security or law-enforcement agencies need to respond to a particular location (for example, a specific bank branch involved in a robbery), it is clear that some relationship existing between the asset tracking and the location must be established but no information is given on this method or system. These patents also do not teach how these security devices could be serviced and tested without sending non-robbery related alerts to security or law enforcement and they do not teach how unintentional activations not related to a theft could create selective alerts to support personnel but not result in an alarm going to the police. Alternatively, U.S. Pat. Nos. 7,292,159, 7,283,047, 7,283,046, 7,138,914 teach that service and maintenance records can be kept on a central server for update or later recall. However, none of them teaches how alerting can be averted or changed based on servicing at a specific location. The cost of police and other law enforcement responding to false alarms continues to be high. Many municipalities have enacted ordinances to charge owners of alarm systems the cost to respond to alerts that are not tied to an active burglary or crime. Some cities have stopped responding to automated alerts altogether.
The sequence of events in a robbery are: 1) the initial assault, device activation and transfer to robber; 2) robber egress; 3) activation and notification to server; 4) server processing; 5) alert processing; 6) law enforcement, police and security dispatch; 7) RF beacon co-location; 8) suspect isolation; and 9) suspect apprehension and recovery. The critical aspect is that this is a system. Many elements act in concert to make the recovery possible. Careful planning and cooperation of multiple organizations are necessary for ultimate success. Having multiple inadvertent alerts go from a bank (or similar installation of a valuable asset) to law enforcement (or similar private security firm) can reduce effectiveness by increasing response time and possibly costs because of fees responding to false alarms.
The design of the system needs to be near-real-time to enable pursuit by police and other law enforcement agencies such as the FBI. Latencies from the measurement of location and velocity to the display at the tracking site of a minute or more could allow for enough separation in a chase to confuse the pursuers. Tests conducted in trials indicated a delay of 15 seconds or less was required. This provided an extremely short timeline to send location information to some central location then disseminate it to the necessary law-enforcement officers. Communication channels would have to be chosen to ensure that controlled (or at least reliable) latency could be maintained.
It is understood by the one skilled in the art that GPS represents a larger set of Global Navigation Satellite Systems or GNSS that are currently fielded and under planning such as GLONASS in Russia, GALILEO in Europe, Beidou in China as well as others.